interview
The Revolutionary Guards are increasingly brutal against demonstrators, but resistance continues. Is the mullahs’ rule wavering? Islamic scholar and Iran expert Reinhard Schulze classifies.
January 13, 2026, 05:50January 13, 2026, 05:50
Fabian Hock / ch media
Hundreds of dead, targeted shots in the head, blocked internet: Iran’s regime is taking brutal action against demonstrators. What does this escalation say about the real threat the protests pose to the state leadership?
Reinhard Schulze: The regime has chosen to respond to the protests with radical physical violence. The demonstrators are not simply arrested and brought to justice, but are sometimes executed on site. The regime is now exercising its dictatorial power much more openly. This is essentially the policy of the Revolutionary Guards, who support the system. It is no longer the policy of President Peseschkian’s government.
Demo in Tehran last weekend.Image: imago
What does this mean for the protesters?
The risk increases enormously for them. This can lead to demobilization.
You mentioned the Revolutionary Guards. What kind of troop is this?
The Revolutionary Guards are the military organs of the ideology that supports the entire system. They are the parallel structure to the regular Iranian army. They have internalized their ideological mission much more than the army, police or other security forces. They support the power of the old system. Part of this is the so-called Basij, the moral guardians, who drive through the streets of Tehran and other cities on motorcycles as moral guardians and are also involved in the confrontations. These two groups form the main pillars of repression.
Prof. em. Reinhard Schulze is an Islamic scholar and expert on Iran. Most recently, he headed the Islam and Middle East Forum at the University of Bern.Image: keystone
What distinguishes these protests from previous ones, such as those after the murder of Mahsa Amini in 2023, which obviously did not lead to the collapse of the system?
A lot: The protests are taking place in the context of a serious structural crisis in the system. In addition, the political environment of protest has changed significantly due to the collapse of the Axis of the Islamic Resistance. The extremely difficult economic situation of the people requires a desperate willingness to resist. The power structure within the old order has shifted significantly towards the Revolutionary Guards. The government failure that is evident in the economic crisis threatens to become a state failure. External intervention options are added. The protests now openly pose the question of power.
Protest in Tehran: Demonstrators have been defying the violence of the regime troops for around two weeks.Image: keystone
How close is the end of the mullahs’ rule in Iran now?
The end is not yet foreseeable, even if many protesters or opposition members in exile hope for it. In Iran itself there is a greater awareness that it is a relatively stable regime based on two pillars: the government of President Peseschkian, which at least tries to organize state action and dialogue, and the heirs of the Islamic revolution. The balance of power is currently shifting significantly in favor of the Revolutionary Guard. Therefore, further radicalization of politics is to be expected.
The current developments around Iran in the ticker:
With what consequences?
First, the regime will try to demonstrate strength. At the same time, however, it shows its inability to solve the country’s real problems – the political, social and economic ones. In the long term, this could lead to the Revolutionary Guards, which support Ayatollah Khamenei, also losing internal legitimacy. Even a coup from within cannot be ruled out.
What would have to happen for Iran to get to this point?
The Revolutionary Guard system, which is still supported by around 20 percent of the population, would have to lose so much legitimacy that it can no longer guarantee security in the country. What would be crucial would be a break between the regular army on the one hand and the Revolutionary Guards on the other. Many opposition members hope for this. They are trying to make contacts in the army and persuade them to intervene.
Then two armies would face each other. That would lead to a civil war.
A similar situation already existed in 1978/79, although not to the extent that would occur today. At that time, the army declared its neutrality and stayed out of the conflict between demonstrators and security forces. It is conceivable that the army will pull the emergency brake again. I doubt whether this will lead directly to a civil war. The army is a central power factor in Iran due to its manpower and institutional roots.
The upheaval ended in 1979 with the deposition of the Shah. Today his son Reza Pahlavi, from exile in the US, is positioning himself as the head of the protest movement. Does it have political relevance in Iran or is it primarily a Western hope project?
It is above all a Western project, supported by royalists who nostalgically dream of a return of Shah rule. In Iran itself it plays a significantly smaller role. There it is remembered that in 2023 he publicly declared that he was actually an American and had nothing to do with the protests in Iran. It is clear to many that a return to him would be a political backward move.
Nevertheless, many opposition members rely on him.
This is primarily instrumental. With his presence in the West, Reza Pahlavi ensures that solidarity with the protests is maintained. It may help western states think about intervention. However, politically it is unlikely to play any role in a transition phase.
But he called for the protests that are shaking the country.
A lot of people do that. However, the Western public focuses heavily on his calls because the Shah’s son generates attention. This creates a false balance. This has little to do with the actual debates within the opposition.
Iranian exiles in particular, like those here in London, are demonstrating for the Shah’s son Reza Pahlavi to come to power.Image: keystone
Doesn’t the opposition still need an integration figure?
I don’t think that’s Reza Pahlavi. US President Trump and his advisors are also skeptical about his self-portrayal as the “father of the nation”. The US government is clearly keeping its distance.
Are there alternatives?
Some are currently trying to bring the People’s Mujahideen into position. Overall, there are many individual interests. I don’t currently see a personality that the opposition in Iran could agree on.
Which scenario is currently considered the most likely?
The US government apparently hopes that parts of the Iranian government – perhaps even the president – will contact the demonstrators in order to create a political alternative to the Revolutionary Guards. That would be a Venezuela scenario. The USA could even imagine flanking this militarily.
Is that what the demonstrators want?
They rely more heavily on support from the country’s elite: from the army, from business circles or from influential personalities. These can also be clergy who distance themselves from the regime.
You mentioned Venezuela. Do you think it is possible that the US will send its Delta Force and kidnap Khamenei, like they did with Nicolas Maduro?
This scenario is being taken seriously in Tehran. Khamenei was therefore relocated to a military base in the east of the country. He is much better protected there. The Iranians have also taken military precautions. The surprise effect would hardly exist after the experiences in Venezuela.
What military intervention could actually weaken the regime?
Targeted attacks on Revolutionary Guard facilities in order to give the demonstrators freedom – for example so that they can take to the streets during the day.
How would the regime react?
It has announced counterattacks on US military installations in Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, as well as on Israel. Tehran is currently concentrating primarily on defending against possible US attacks. These would be significantly more substantial than anything that happened in Venezuela.
Could such an attack bring down the regime?
Yes, if the Revolutionary Guards were no longer able to act afterwards. Then the regime lacked the means to defend itself against both the internal protests and external pressure. That would mean the end of the Islamic Republic.
Who would then take power?
First of all, probably the Iranian army, not the demonstrators.
Donald Trump says Iran wants to negotiate with him. How seriously should this be taken?
The offer was foreseeable. It’s bait for Trump. Nuclear negotiations with the USA would give the regime new legitimacy – and would make the protests come to nothing. The government hopes so.
Ayatollah Khamenei too?
That would be a nightmare for him. His system as a counterpoint to the government would lose legitimacy. So far he hasn’t commented, and I don’t think he’ll sit down at the table with the “American devils.”
How would the protesters react?
They would be deeply disappointed and feel betrayed – also because they themselves are trying to build an alliance with the USA.
If we look back in a year: the beginning of a transition or the brutal survival of the regime?
That cannot be said. One thing is clear: there will be a fundamental change in Iran this year. We don’t know how quickly it will come, nor what political structure will emerge from it – reform, coup or something else. What is most likely is that elites from business, administration and the army will intervene to prevent the country from completely disintegrating. Looking back, one would probably speak of a fundamental political and military coup. (aargauerzeitung.ch)