analysis
The longer the war with the USA and Israel drags on, the more clearly cracks within the Iranian power apparatus become apparent.
April 21, 2026, 9:15 a.mApril 21, 2026, 9:15 a.m
Last Friday, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abbas Araghchi, announced The Strait of Hormuz is “fully open” to trade.
This commented a representative of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) as follows: “We will open it on the orders of our leader, Imam Khamenei – and not because of some idiot’s tweets.” The Navy attacked the very next day Revolutionary Guard several merchant ships. At the same time, the IRGC stated that it still considered the strait to be effectively closed. No ship “of any type or nationality” is permitted to pass through. Tasnim and Fars, two IRGC-affiliated news agencies, were unusually harsh in describing Araghchi’s statement as a “complete lack of tact.”
Foreign Minister Araghchi. Image: www.imago-images.de
Evidence of a power struggle
Some observers see this contradiction between the different institutions of the mullah state as an indication that an internal Iranian power struggle has broken out between different factions. And there is further evidence of this: around a week after the start of the war Iranian President Massoud Peseschkian apologized for the attacks by Iranian forces on the Gulf states: “I would like to apologize on my behalf to the neighboring countries attacked by Iran,” he said in a TV speech.
Peseschkian said that from now on the Iranian armed forces would no longer attack neighboring countries – “unless we are attacked by these countries.” Despite this assurance Iranian drone and missile attacks on the Gulf states continued and Hardliners criticized harshly to Peseschkian. “Your strange apology to neighboring countries has caused general regret (…) The attacks by our armed forces give no reason for such a humiliating apology on your part,” commented parliamentarian Mohammad Manan-Raisi. The Islamist news portal Raja News wrote: “Just take the microphone away from him!”
President Peseschkian. Image: EPA
The factions within the Iranian leadership also do not seem to speak with one voice on the question of whether Tehran will take part in another round of negotiations with the US in Pakistan: While the Foreign Ministry confirmed that new talks would take place, although no date has yet been set, media close to the IRGC reported that Iran had refused to continue negotiating with the US, because the American demands were “excessive”.. In addition, different Iranian factions are said to have brought very different positions to the negotiating table in the failed first round of talks in Islamabad.
Pragmatist…
The division between the factions runs along a dividing line that existed long before the current war, with antagonisms expressed through the authority of the supreme spiritual leader Ali Khamenei were kept in check: On the one hand there is the political leadership around President Massoud Peseschkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Also the President of Parliament, who is actually one of the hardliners Mohammad Ghalibafwho has been considered the de facto defense minister and most powerful politician in the Islamic Republic since the death of Security Council chief Ali Larijani, is likely to belong to this pragmatic wing. Also on this site is some of the traditional clergy. This faction is trying to limit the damage in the current conflict and is more open to a negotiated solution.
Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf.Image: keystone
… and hardliners
On the other side is the armed Revolutionary Guard under the commander Major General Ahmad Vahidiallied with part of the clergy who are around Modshtaba Khamenei flock, the son and successor of Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the first days of the war. The IRGC not only has its own army, navy and air force as well as its own secret service with a total of around 200,000 men, it also controls the million-strong volunteer militia Basijis. As a state within a state, the IRGC also controls significant parts of the economy. This camp consists primarily of hardliners and relies on rocket attacks and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz to put pressure on the USA.
IRGC Commander Vahidi. Image: AP
Weakened army
The regular Iranian armyusually called “Artesh”, has been severely weakened by the fighting and the death of Chief of General Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi – who was an important interface with the IRGC. There has been a rivalry between Artesh and the IRGC since the early days of the Islamic Republic, as these two armed forces compete for resources and influence, although the army tends to be less ideologically focused than the IRGC, which sees itself as the guardian of the Islamic Revolution. Parts of the regular army are likely to support the political leadership, also because the IRGC is favored in the allocation of ammunition and equipment thanks to its proximity to the clerical leadership.
Divided clergy
The Shiite clergy formally has a strong position in the Islamic Republic: it controls the Council of Experts – which formally decides on the new supreme leader – and the Guardian Council – which selects the candidates. But the mullahs are, as mentioned, divided into two camps; the hardliners around Moschtaba Khamenei and more pragmatic clerics who support the political leadership.
Advance into the power vacuum
The Revolutionary Guard under Vahidi managed to take advantage of the power vacuum that formed after the death of Ali Khamenei. On the one hand, his successor Moschtaba Khamenei lacks the religious authority of his father, as he is not an Ayatollah, but merely a Hojatoleslam. On the other hand, his successor has the smell of a dynastic transfer of power, which doesn’t really fit with the system of the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, the new supreme leader was himself injured in the killing of his father and has not appeared in public since. All of this suggests that he relies heavily on the support of the IRGC, which is increasingly able to make strategic decisions while the president and parliament lose influence.
The new supreme leader Moschtaba Khamenei has not yet appeared in public. Image: keystone
Vahidi’s ambitions are likely to go beyond controlling the Iranian military apparatus. The major general, who was already in 1994 Bomb attack on a Jewish community center played an important role in Argentina, was instrumental in the suppression of the Iranian protest movement in 2022 and has commanded the IRGC since March, apparently tried to give the Revolutionary Guard the lead in the negotiations in Islamabad.
The Institute for the Study of War writes in an analysisthe IRGC’s increasing control over Iranian decision-making suggests that Iranian leaders currently negotiating with the US do not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions. These more pragmatic people were sidelined by the IRGC. If this assessment is correct, it does not bode well for future rounds of negotiations.
Iranian military spokesman: “USA is negotiating with itself”
Video: watson/Emanuella Kälin