A U.S. soldier covers the face of a statue of Saddam Hussein with an American flag in Iraq, 2003.Image: keystone
The USA has already attempted regime change 31 times. It rarely worked – it was particularly devastating in Iraq. What are they doing wrong?
March 8, 2026, 6:12 amMarch 8, 2026, 6:12 am
Christoph Bopp / ch media
Is the Israeli-American attack on Iran a regime change war or not? If even the US president, who contradicts himself in this regard, obviously doesn’t know, an attempt to clarify the term might be helpful.
“Regime change” means the attempt, initiated from outside with more or less force, to initiate a change of government in a foreign country. The term experienced its boom during the administration of the younger President GW Bush. After the “victory” in the Cold War for the right system and after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, neoconservatives in the USA formulated a kind of doctrine according to which the USA, as the sole regulatory power in the world, had to bring peace, freedom, capitalism and democracy (the order is still debated).
The Iraq War was a prime example of this. As we know, he failed spectacularly – at least in the goals mentioned above. The most immediate cause was the shocking ignorance with which people went to war. It was thought that once the hated dictator Saddam Hussein was gone, everything would fall into place. As we now know, things turned out completely differently.
The role of the secret services
While the “traditional” wars of states in Europe formulated the war aim in the Clausewitzian sense of “imposing his will on the enemy,” which specifically meant taking resources or a piece of territory from him, the American War of Independence was actually already a war of regime change. And it’s probably not wrong to characterize World War II in particular as such. Even if the extent of the losses and damage far exceeded anything seen before, the Allies still wanted to disempower or abolish the Hitler and Tenno regimes.
The reshaping of Europe after the Second World War brought a certain sharpness to the term. Stalin made his satellites “communist”, in Greece the USA and Great Britain prevented this in the civil war of 1946-1949. These were more or less open state interventions. The Second World War aroused the need for expanded secret services, especially in the USA. The 1948 elections in Italy were perhaps the first example of how the CIA, a non-governmental organization, prevented a communist attempt to take over power.
In any case, the Italian operation served as a blueprint for “covert actions” that prevented or encouraged coup attempts in foreign countries, as the case may be. And she provided the model for the saying “men who work on the future of other countries,” which became common at the time. In 1953, at the request of the British, the CIA overthrew the elected president Mossadegh in Iran (it was about oil), Arbenz followed in Guatemala in 1954 (United Fruits vs. government), the attempt with Castro in Cuba failed in the late 1950s and 1960s.
The Soviets initially held back from secret service operations in the Third World. Their interventions in their own sphere of influence were unabashedly military: in 1953 in the GDR, in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. They served to maintain power and influence, although it was not always clear what the “revolutionaries” in the socialist countries actually had in mind. “Introducing capitalism” wasn’t really it.
The US has already tried 31 times
The most zealous regime change nation over the last 200 years has undoubtedly been the USA. Even before 9/11, the USA (some of them together with allies) had overthrown 31 governments or leaders (mainly in South America, of course, but these also include Germany and Japan, Iran and South Vietnam, to name just the best-known cases).
The political scientist Alexander B. Downes has this in his book “Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong”. (Cornell Univ. Press 2021). Behind them are the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Germany and France, which shows that imperialism/colonialism of the 19th century plays a major role. The most common target of such attempts was not, as would be expected, Afghanistan (six coups), but Honduras with eight cases, although it was primarily the smaller neighbors who intervened in Honduras.
Most attempts fail
It is obvious that it is tempting for a superpower like the USA, which is so much stronger militarily, to overthrow unpleasant governments in foreign countries. But the danger of misjudging the unpredictable consequences is even greater, as illustrated by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s statement to Congress in 2003 that it was “difficult to imagine” that it would take many more soldiers to stabilize Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein than were necessary to overthrow him.
It is also blinding if one believes in ideological constructions such as the “domino theory,” according to which the fall of one country (to communism) inevitably leads to the fall of the next. US foreign policy in the 1950s listened intently to the narrative: China lost, Korea almost lost, Vietnam not lost!
Downes took the trouble to really investigate the matter thoroughly. As the title suggests, the verdict is clear: As a rule, it is not worth overthrowing a foreign regime from outside, especially not by force. Almost half of all governments installed by foreign powers were overthrown by local forces, usually in a bloody manner. In a third of cases there was a civil war within ten years after regime change.
Three different cases
Downes broadly distinguishes between three cases of regime change: The elimination of a ruling clique or elite with the effect that another group takes over. Secondly, the overthrow of a government in order to introduce other institutions (these can be democratic, but also communist, as shown by the successful attempts of the Soviet Union to line up its satellites after the Second World War). And third, the reinstallation of a regime that was also violently removed. This applies to many victims of the Nazi war of conquest. Belgium experienced this twice (1914 and 1940), both “restorations” after the end of the war went smoothly.
The failed attempts by the USA in recent years (Afghanistan and Iraq) were regime changes of the first category. The governments appointed by the occupying power were not accepted. Could Iran become a combination of Type 1 and Type 3? After all, the Shah survived for a relatively long time after 1953, although without the rule of law or democracy. But the ruling clique is still too firmly entrenched to believe that a Shah junior can carry out a successful transition. So Type 1. And the USA has not yet shone with Type 2. Germany, Japan after 1945 and perhaps Panama after 1989 would be successful examples.
Two reasons for failure
Why do most attempts fail? Downes cites two main causes: First, the fragmentation of the military. If large numbers of unorganized armed people persist after a coup, it will be difficult to restore the state’s monopoly on violence. Uprisings and civil war are the consequences.
Second, the delegitimization of the new government. The newly installed rulers quickly find themselves in a dilemma between the demands of the power that installed them and the wishes of the local elites and the population. As a rule, the two do not coincide completely. The policies of the overthrown government probably had the support of at least part of the population.
Around 1848, regime change attempts were common in Europe. Switzerland was lucky even then and was spared. The European powers had too much to do elsewhere to reinstall noble potentates after the uprisings and revolutions. (aargauerzeitung.ch)