Vladimir Putin is emblazoned on a T-shirt: The Kremlin boss is omnipresent in Russia.image: epa
interview
In his new book, Moscow-born writer Alexander Estis explains why blanket judgments about “the Russians” are misleading – and why propaganda and repression leave little room for resistance.
02/22/2026, 05:2402/22/2026, 07:39
What responsibility do the Russian people bear for the war in Ukraine?
Alexander Estis: The responsibility of the population collective is absolute. This war would not be possible without the support of a large part of society. At the same time, responsibility decreases downwards: the main burden is borne by political elites, secret services, the military and oligarchs. On the one hand, among the ordinary population there are nationalist hardliners who actively support the war. Others want peace, but share imperial claims to power – for example, that Donbass must belong to Russia. And there is a minority that is clearly against the war, but is not being heard.
They complain that many in the West misinterpret the Russians and don’t really understand how this Russian society actually feels about the war. What exactly do you accuse Western observers of?
The West often underestimates the heterogeneity of Russian society. When people talk about “the Russians” or their “will,” it remains a generalization that ignores central differences in realities of life, fears and ideas about the future.
Writer and columnist Alexander Estis at a discussion event in the Dietrich-Keuning-Haus in Dortmund. image: imago
What is the consequence of this?
Some people demonize “the Russians” across the board and look for the depths of the Russian soul, the evil Russian bear. This is just as misleading as the apologia of those who understand Putin and Russia, such as Roger Köppel, who travel to Moscow and then claim that everything is not so bad and that Russia is free – without any understanding of how this society itself suffers, whether consciously or unconsciously.
With “Russia, a henchman state,” you have now published a book in which you describe the nature of Russian society in detail. Was this educational work your main motivation when writing?
It was initially a way of dealing with the war. Russia is doing something that dismays me, horrifies me, disgusts me – and I have to at least react in some way. At the same time, the image of Russia that many people in the West have – including so-called Russia experts – does not correspond to the facts. As someone who knows the country from the inside and has contacts in society, I wanted to do something to counteract this.
In the foreword to your book you say that you are actually a writer and not a daily political journalist. Why did you choose this form of reporting?
I have already written two fiction books that have to do with Russia. Actually, I was almost done with it. Dealing with such a topic in literature requires a lot of time, deepening and a certain distance. In this case, however, it was very important to keep up to date with the day. The news was overwhelming at the start of the war, and it continues to this day. The fascization of Russian politics and society is progressing rapidly, one law after another is being passed, people are being arrested, and the media is being closed. Every message leads to an inner indignation and the feeling of having to do something about it. This creates completely different forms of work and routines than literary work requires.
In one of your essays you call for people to become “Putin understanders”. How are we supposed to understand that?
This is of course a deliberately provocative appeal. The very people who are described as understanding Putin actually understand Putin the least as a person and as a product of a certain system. They have understanding of him, but no understanding of his nature. Incidentally, a lot of things get lost in translation – for example when he uses criminal jargon.
What can we do to understand Putin better?
Above all, one should listen to those who know the Russian system from their own, often painful, experience: opposition politicians, journalists and scientists who have fled Putin’s Russia. They often understand the internal logic and, above all, the nuances better than Western experts, even if some of them represent an image of Russia that is too optimistic for me. What is particularly problematic, however, are local voices that trivialize Putin or portray him as a reliable negotiating partner – partly out of misinterpretation, partly because of their own agenda. Putin does not honor agreements because they were made, but only when they serve his interests or when he is under duress. Anyone who portrays him differently is deceiving themselves – or the audience.
Souvenir shop with a cardboard cutout of Vladimir Putin in Moscow. image: epa
They themselves describe him as a “street thug” with secret service training. How dangerous is this combination?
Extremely dangerous. Personally, he comes from a criminal background characterized by a willingness to use violence, a lack of principles and the rule of the strongest. Through his training in the secret services, this aggressiveness was professionalized and made strategically usable. At the same time, he can present himself as a people-oriented guy who speaks the simple, direct, aggressive language of the people, and yet also act as a calculating strategist. What he says is rarely meant exactly, but is in the service of domestic or foreign policy communication goals. Western politicians often take his statements far too literally.
What drives him?
I try to avoid psychological interpretations. Psychologists should judge whether Putin is narcissistic, sociopathic or paranoid. What drives him is, in my view, trivial: an insatiable hunger for power. His motivations and methods are those of a street thug who wants to control even more blocks, and those of a corrupt official who schemes his way into the system. Putin does not follow a fixed ideology. His contradictions are not a coincidence, but rather an expression of opportunism: he always says what benefits his power interests in the specific situation. There are, of course, ideological components, such as his idea of Russian greatness and the insult to the collapsed great power. But all of this obviously revolves around the desire to be perceived as powerful and dangerous – whether as a person or in relation to one’s own country. In this sense, for me, Putin is an absolutely trivial tyrant.
A man walks past a poster with a Russian soldier and the words “The Fatherland We Defend” in St. Petersburg. picture: ap
At some point there must come a point where the Russians refuse to follow him.
This is a very central point: the Russians have been an extremely unfortunate society since the time of the Tsar. The life of the ordinary citizen had and has little value. At the same time, the population is massively intimidated. Most people say to themselves: As long as I’m not directly affected, I’ll stay out of it. And if they are then directly affected, it is of course too late. This leads to isolation, apoliticism and a retreat into the private sphere. In addition, many struggle for daily survival. For them, the war sometimes doesn’t seem like the abyss it is compared to their miserable everyday lives.
Mothers consciously send their sons to war – knowing that they will most likely die, but also with the prospect of financial compensation. In the end it is said that the son has done something for the fatherland and for the family. There are these well-known interviews with mothers: How cool, composed and emotionless some people talk about their killed children is hard to understand from a humanistic, Western perspective. This shows how deep this dullness goes. Therefore, one must understand that larger protests can hardly ever be expected. Most of the opposition members have long been in exile. And since Navalny’s death, there has been no figurehead who could rally people behind him. This character has been murdered.
Indifference to the war – captured at a bus stop in Moscow.image: epa
The emergence of a real opposition is suppressed by repression, but you also write that this process began much earlier. What role does propaganda play?
Repression and indoctrination work together like pliers. This makes social resistance almost impossible and extremely unlikely. Even large networks of opposition members, if they existed, would hardly be able to take action because the state is very experienced in crushing protest. People are sometimes arrested for their online posts even before they can take to the streets to protest. Change would only be conceivable if parts of the military turned against the leadership – but that is also unlikely. Dissatisfaction decreases towards the top: it is mainly among ordinary soldiers and hardly in the higher ranks. The most likely thing to change in Russia is Ukraine’s military successes.
Alexander Estis: Russia’s henchman state. Ideology, propaganda, repression and resistance. NZZ Libro, 156 pages.image: nzz libro
Alexander Estis will read from his latest book “Russia, a henchman state” on February 25th at the Aargau Cantonal Library in Aarau.