UN Security Council defeat raises questions about Germany’s global standing

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ByDr. Alexander Wolf, head of the capital city office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation

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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

Germany has lost the election to the UN Security Council. This is not a foreign policy drama, but a symptom. It is not the seat itself that weighs heavily, but what the defeat reveals about Germany’s position in the world.

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Annalena Baerbock, of all people, had to announce the result. As President of the UN General Assembly, the former foreign minister on Wednesday delivered the verdict on a policy that was, to a large extent, her own. Germany received 104 votes; 127 were required. Portugal received 134 and Austria 131.

Three EU countries competed for two seats, and the largest and richest of them all failed in the first round of voting. Germany had never failed in a bid before.

Government carries Baerbock’s legacy

Foreign minister Johann Wadephul calls this a bitter defeat and blames the late entry. That is actually true. It just doesn’t explain why Germany was 23 votes short in the end. If you start a few months too late, you lose by a narrow margin. Falling so short suggests another issue was at play.

These reasons have to do with credibility, and they didn’t materialize overnight. Germany’s stance in the Gaza war, its restrained reaction to the Israeli strike against Iran and its silence on the American intervention in Venezuela have come in for criticism. This was read outside Europe as proof that Germany does not take its own standards very seriously.

Foreign policy has a lasting effect, and the reputation of a country makes for itself is paid for years later. The current government is largely carrying a legacy that is not its own.

Under Annalena Baerbock, German foreign policy was strongly defined by morality, with a stance in the global South and softer tones as soon as tangible interests got in the way. Such impressions stick, even if others have long since been taken over.

Moscow worked against Germany

One party in particular benefited from this: Russia. It goes without saying that Moscow worked against the German bid in the background. You won’t find any evidence with file numbers, that’s what this kind of diplomacy is made for. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Germany has been Moscow’s most important opponent in Europe because we supply the weapons, support the sanctions and keep Ukraine afloat. The fact that the Kremlin likes to keep its fiercest adversary outside of Ukraine out of the world’s most powerful body is simply logic.

The votes that Germany lacked came predominantly from the regions of the world that Moscow and Beijing have long been courting. The fact that Austria, a neutral state that both sides find more convenient, won the vote fits perfectly.

In the end, both sides are responsible. Russia has put in the work, and Berlin has made it easy, because part of this country still does not accept the seriousness of the situation. Anyone who believes that it is only about the UN fails to realize who we are dealing with. A regime that poisons opponents, abducts Ukrainian children and wages a hybrid war against us does not suddenly become squeamish when choosing its main opponent. We should accept this reality and finally take the gloves off.

A reality check

Losing the seat itself is not such a great blow. The Security Council has been hampered for years because the USA, China and Russia have been blocking each other and has not prevented anything in the Ukraine war or for a long time in Gaza. A seat at this table is more of a symbol than a lever.

The defeat is therefore more of a reality check. It shows that Germany is not unimportant, but less effective than it could be.

Because it wasn’t down to willpower. Germany wanted this seat, invested money and sent a foreign minister on a publicity tour.

What was lacking was not ambition, but the ability to translate it into results. This runs through Germany’s entire foreign and security policy. The turnaround was proclaimed in 2022, but the Bundeswehr is still not in the condition that speeches have promised, and strategic autonomy is demanded but hardly ever built. Weight does not come from size alone. It comes from the ability to organize majorities, and this is precisely where the deficit lies.

Germany must use its financial leeway

The situation analysis in Berlin is not wrong. Germany is too small to make a difference on its own and should involve its European partners earlier and more seriously, on an equal footing.

At the same time, it is too big to duck away: the fourth largest economy in the world, the largest contributor to the EU, one of the largest donors to the United Nations. But tougher stances alone are not enough. In an arena in which Beijing and Washington show little regard for others, Berlin must be prepared to play hardball while still remaining capable of winning a majority. Otherwise, it could once again end up with 104 votes.

Germany has an asset that many underestimate. It is creditworthy and has more financial room for maneuver than almost any partner. When things get serious, this is a currency, provided that a clearly tailored role is formed from it and then also fulfilled.

The next opportunity will not come for another eight years. That is plenty of time and using it would mean announcing less and delivering more. A country that needs 127 votes and gets 104 did not fail because of a lack of ambition. It failed because it achieved too little. Whether anyone in Berlin understands this is the only question that really matters after this Wednesday.

Dr Alexander Wolf heads the Berlin office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation and holds a doctorate in International Relations from the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich. He previously spent eight years as a soldier in the Special Operations Division, NATO mission in Albania/Kosovo in 1999. He specializes in AI as industrial policy, semiconductors as geo-economic bottlenecks and capital markets as early warning systems for political shifts.