Konstantin Eggert is a Russian-born journalist with DW, Germany’s international broadcaster. He is based in Vilnius and was previously editor-in-chief of the BBC Russian Service Moscow bureau.
“Which side do I take today – Baku or Yerevan?” It is 2001 or 2002. Location – the BBC Moscow bureau, where I then worked. The man speaking is political scientist Sergei Markov, who has been invited to take part in a discussion programme on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
By then he was known in Moscow media circles for two things – 24/7 availability and producing any opinion required – as long as the fee was right. I do not remember which side Markov took on that particular occasion, but it is certain that he took home $50 in cash, the standard BBC fee at the time.
For years, Markov was a notorious pro-regime figure, regular participant in state TV shows, vociferously defending Vladimir Putin’s every action, including the brutal invasion of Ukraine.
But last week the Kremlin suddenly designated Markov a ‘foreign agent’ – an “honour” previously reserved for politicians, journalists and NGO activists who oppose Putin’s policies. He is the first ever pro-regime figure punished in such a way.
Why punish Markov, after years of unfaltering loyalty? The answer lies in his ties to the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who Markov had energetically promoted in the public sphere. For years, no one in Moscow paid attention to Markov’s connections to Azerbaijan, given that Russia’s relations with Baku were generally good.
Times change. Markov’s sudden ejection from the Kremlin’s grace is a signal to the Moscow elite – “Azerbaijan is the enemy now”.
In fact, the relationship between the two authoritarian regimes was never simple – despite Russia playing a dominant role in the South Caucasus for the best part of the past two centuries. Baku detested Moscow’s close ties to Armenia (which still formally include a military pact signed in 1997). For a quarter of a century this meant that Azerbaijan couldn’t even think about taking back the Nagorno Karabakh region, populated by Armenians, with their unrecognized Artsakh Republic.
The Kremlin always viewed oil-rich Azerbaijan’s independent energy policy with suspicion. Baku’s warm relationship with Israel, based on mutual interest in deterring Iran – Russia’s ally – was and is another irritant for Moscow. Massive Azerbaijani weapons purchases from Israel further complicated the situation, as well as its strategic relationship with Erdogan’s Turkey.
Then, without warning (or, ostensibly, any consultation with Putin), President Aliyev ordered a lightning army offensive in 2023 and retook Nagorno-Karabakh in a few days. The move created a wave of anti-Russian feeling among Armenians, who claimed Russia didn’t fulfil its obligations under the mutual assistance treaty and left Karabakh Armenians defenceless. The Russians countered that the agreement covers only the legally recognised territory of Armenia (which is true)
It seems Moscow was generally reluctant to deter Azerbaijan as a means of punishing Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for his increasing distance from Russia and growing cooperation with the EU. But Moscow’s inaction only fed the image of Russia’s impotence, disorientation and ultimately, weakness. Which was not unnoticed in Baku and Yerevan.
The peace treaty signed by Azerbaijan and Armenia in Washington on 8 August happened without any Russian participation, something that would have been unimaginable a couple of years ago. It came after both Aliyev and Pashinyan had distanced their countries from Russia – a strategic choice rather than a tactical manoeuvre.
In a recent interview, Aliyev called out Moscow for “invading” Ukraine, stated emphatically that he stands by Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and accused Soviet Russia of occupying his country in 1920 – a historical truth that always went unmentioned in bilateral relations.
It is remarkable and politically significant that both leaders appear to have broken with a long-standing policy of taking into account the fate of the huge Armenian and Azeri diasporas in Russia, both numbering well over a million. It was always a factor that impacted politics, business, educational ties between countries – and gave Moscow an additional lever of influence in the South Caucasus. Not anymore, it seems.
And whilst Georgia remains within Moscow’s orbit, two hundred years of Russian influence in the South Caucasus are on the wane. Putin only has himself to blame. His war on Ukraine, especially the 2022 full-scale invasion, terrified not only Russia’s neighbours but also allies like Armenia. It also showcased Russia’s military decay. Just compare its army to the Turkish-trained Azerbaijani forces with their mastery of modern Israeli and Western weapons.
What Russia lacks on the battlefield it compensates with brutality, plunder and war crimes. This is then played back on smartphone screens across the Caucasus (and increasingly Central Asia). The effect is long-term and will be very difficult to reverse.
A total of 34 years after the end of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan are saying goodbye to Moscow. Punishing the hapless Sergei Markov looks like Putin’s only response.
